Singapore’s proposed quantum-safe migration guidance will strengthen banks’ preparedness against future cybersecurity threats, although the transition to new cryptographic systems will involve significant technology investments, operational challenges and coordination with third-party providers, Moody’s Ratings said on last Thursday.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has recently published proposed guidance setting out indicative timelines for financial institutions to migrate to quantum-safe cryptography, aimed at strengthening operational resilience against potential threats from increasingly powerful quantum computers.

Moody’s said in a note that the proposals would help banks address emerging vulnerabilities by encouraging early and coordinated preparation, while translating preparedness priorities into specific supervisory milestones.

Under the proposed guidance, financial institutions are expected to develop migration plans by Dec 31, 2027, migrate critical systems by end-2030 and complete the migration of remaining systems by end-2034.

Critical Information Infrastructure Owners (CIIOs), Domestic Systemically Important Banks and Network for Electronic Transfers (NETS) would be expected to submit their migration plans by June 30, 2027. CIIOs would also be expected to migrate their critical information infrastructure systems by end-2029.

The proposed timelines are indicative expectations rather than legally binding obligations. Financial institutions facing technical or operational difficulties would be expected to document deviations and implement interim controls.

Moody’s said the timetable broadly aligned with its expectation that full migration across the banking sector would extend into the early to mid-2030s, highlighting that quantum-safe migration would be a multiyear technology transformation programme rather than a conventional software upgrade.

The rating agency noted that Singapore banks had been aware of quantum-related risks and had been asked to develop relevant expertise and governance capabilities since February 2024.

It said clearer supervisory milestones would reduce the risk of delayed preparation, although implementation would add to technology expenditure and create operational challenges.

The proposals also reinforced Moody’s view that banks’ preparedness and ability to execute migration plans would matter more to their credit profiles than predicting when a quantum computer capable of breaking existing cryptographic systems would emerge.

MAS’s guidance emphasises board and senior management commitment, clear accountability, adequate resources and regular progress reporting, alongside comprehensive inventories of cryptographic systems and adequately funded, risk-based migration plans.

Moody’s said these measures would be important in identifying vulnerabilities early and ensuring banks have sufficient capacity to manage the transition. Quantum preparedness could increasingly differentiate banks’ credit resilience over time.

Global banking sector faces complex migration

Globally, quantum computing is unlikely to create immediate credit pressure for most banks, but the transition to quantum-safe cryptography will increasingly test their technology governance, operational resilience, investment capacity and management of critical third-party dependencies, Moody’s said.

Banks rely extensively on public-key cryptography to protect payment instructions, customer authentication, digital identities, confidential information and communications with other financial institutions.

A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could eventually break several encryption methods widely used today, potentially allowing attackers to decrypt sensitive information, impersonate identities or manipulate transactions.

Although quantum computers already exist and are used for research and experimentation, they remain too small and error-prone to break the cryptographic systems currently used by banks.

No cryptographically relevant quantum computer is publicly known to exist. However, the potential consequences of such a development mean banks cannot afford to delay preparations, as cryptographic inventories, system remediation, vendor coordination and infrastructure upgrades could take many years to complete.

The most optimistic forecasts suggest a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could emerge as early as 2029-30, leaving banks with limited time to complete the transition.

Moody’s said the central challenge was therefore one of preparedness and implementation capacity rather than forecasting the precise arrival of quantum technology capable of compromising existing encryption.

An immediate concern is the so-called “harvest now, decrypt later” (HNDL) threat, in which attackers collect encrypted information today and retain it until quantum technology becomes capable of decrypting it.

This exposes banks to risks even before sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available, particularly for information that must remain confidential over long periods.

Such information includes customer identification records, legal agreements and sensitive financial data belonging to institutional clients. These may face greater exposure than routine transactional information with limited long-term sensitivity.

Moody’s noted that MAS’s proposed approach to prioritising business-critical and internet-facing assets, as well as information requiring long retention periods, was consistent with addressing these risks.

However, the transition to post-quantum cryptography would primarily strengthen protection for future systems, communications and transactions, and might not protect information that attackers had already obtained and retained.

Technology upgrades and third-party coordination

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) refers to encryption algorithms designed to remain secure against attacks from both conventional and quantum computers.

These algorithms can generally operate on existing computing infrastructure, meaning banks would not need quantum computers to implement them.

However, the transition is not straightforward, as PQC involves larger encryption keys and digital signatures, which require additional processing capacity and could necessitate hardware upgrades, including security modules, smartcards and older devices.

Poorly managed changes could also create compatibility issues with legacy systems and disrupt banking services.

Moody’s said the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalised PQC standards in 2024, with the technology already being used to protect encrypted web connections through default support in major browsers.

However, adoption of post-quantum digital signatures and integration into core financial infrastructure remain at an early stage.

Several international banks have conducted pilot projects, although most remain at the proof-of-concept stage or involve testing on non-production systems.

Moody’s expects leading institutions to begin introducing PQC into selected systems over the next several years, particularly customer-facing websites and application connections, before extending migration across their wider infrastructure.

The rating agency also highlighted the importance of cryptographic agility, which refers to banks’ ability to replace or upgrade cryptographic algorithms as security requirements and standards evolve.

Institutions with greater cryptographic agility would be better positioned to adapt to future threats and reduce the complexity of migration.

Coordination with technology providers will also be essential, as banks cannot achieve quantum resilience independently of their vendors and financial infrastructure providers.

Under MAS’s proposed guidance, financial institutions are expected to align vendors’ migration roadmaps with their own timelines, test system performance and interoperability, and implement changes in phases.

Moody’s said reliance on common technology providers could create concentration risks, particularly if delays or implementation problems affect multiple financial institutions simultaneously.

Costs unlikely to trigger immediate rating pressure

The principal near-term credit implications of quantum-safe migration are expected to be operational and financial rather than immediate rating pressure, Moody’s said.

Clearer regulatory expectations should encourage banks to increase investments and identify preparedness gaps earlier, but the costs associated with system discovery, remediation, hardware upgrades and testing could add to technology expenditure.

The financial burden could be proportionately greater for smaller or less profitable banks, which may have fewer resources to manage complex technology transformations.

Quantum risk is not currently a standalone rating driver. However, its credit relevance could increase if implementation deficiencies, vendor delays or migration-related disruptions expose broader weaknesses in technology governance and operational resilience.

Moody’s said the ability to execute migration plans in a timely and controlled manner, rather than simply meeting regulatory deadlines, would ultimately determine banks’ resilience against future quantum-related threats.

The MAS proposals therefore represent an important step towards strengthening the banking sector’s preparedness, while underscoring the need for sustained investment, effective governance and close coordination across the financial services ecosystem.

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